A trade union whose purpose is to raise wages above the competitive level may foster economic growth if it succeeds in shifting income away from the owners of capital to the workers and if the workers' marginal propensity to save exceeds the one of capitalists. We make this point i n a n o verlapping generations framework with unionized labor. Considering a monopoly union which cares for wages and employment, we determine a range of trade union objectives and characterize the aggregate technology so that the union's policy spurs per capita income growth and increases welfare of all generations that adhere to the union.
Introduction
A trade union is usually de ned as an organization whose purpose is to improve the material welfare of members, principally by raising wages above the competitive level. " Booth 1995, p. 51 . This paper considers a trade union acting in this way and asks whether and how it a ects economic growth.
The argument that leads us to answer these questions points to the link between the distribution of factor incomes and aggregate savings. It is well established see, e.g., Bertola 1993 Bertola , 1996 that the growth performance of an economy is closely related to aggregate savings, i.e., to the part of aggregate output used for capital formation. In turn, aggregate savings are linked to the factor-income distribution if the propensities to save out of wage and capital income in the economy d o not coincide. Therefore institutions or policies that impinge on the factor-income distribution are likely to a ect economic growth.
The central idea of this paper is that a centralized trade union may qualify as such an institution. Indeed, a union that succeeds in shifting income away from the owners of capital to the workers by raising wages above the competitive level may foster growth if the economy's propensity t o s a ve out of wage income exceeds its propensity to save out of capital income.
The study of this idea requires an analytical framework which allows for aggregate savings to beendogenously linked to both the factor-income distribution of the economy and the rate of economic growth. For simplicity w e consider a twoperiod overlapping generations OLG economy exposed to endogenous growth a la Romer 1986 . We introduce a monopoly union which sets wages at the beginning of each period so as to maximize an objective function having the real wage and the level of employment of union members as its arguments. The notion of a trade union objective" refers to the relative weight a union attaches to either argument.
We analyze balanced growth equilibria and use the equilibrium under laissezfaire as a benchmark to which w e relate the equilibrium with unionized labor. The comparison allows us to determine a range of trade union objectives and conditions on the aggregate technology so that the equilibrium with unionized labor exhibits faster per capita income growth. The intuition behind these ndings is as follows. In an OLG economy savings are closely linked to the economy's wage income as only young workers save. Therefore, a union policy that raises aggregate wage income spurs economic growth. In turn, this is possible if the aggregate technology is such that the e ect of a reduction in employment due to wages above laissezfaire levels induces a pronounced shift in the factor-income distribution in favor of wage incomes but only a small reduction in aggregate output.
Having identi ed the growth e ects of unionized labor, we consider its impact on individual welfare. We nd that unionized labor may lead to higher welfare of all generations that adhere to the union if it has a strong positive e ect on per capita income growth. This is because the old of each generation su er a loss in capital income which has to be o set against the increase in wage income. The negative e ect on the old arises as unemployment l o wers the marginal productivity of capital implying a reduced rate of return on old age savings. For the same reason, introducing a labor union cannot be Pareto-improving as the current old will only bea ected by the union's policy in the form of reduced old age capital income.
There are two strands of the literature on economic growth which are related to the present paper. The rst strand includes papers on endogenous growth and labor market imperfections such as Agell and Lommerud 1993 , Cahuc and Michel 1996 , and Hellwig and Irmen 1999 . Agell and Lommerud consider a labor union that pursues an egalitarian wage policy. They show that the union may foster structural change in favor of increased productivity growth by compressing wage di erentials between low-productivity and high-productivity sectors. Related arguments are employed by Cahuc and Michel and Hellwig and Irmen who consider minimum wage legislation. These authors show that minimum wages may m o ve the economy t o wards more human capital respectively knowledge intensive production again stimulating per capita income growth.
The second line of research studies the growth e ects of intergenerational transfers. Saint-Paul 1992 , Wiedmer 1996 and Wigger 1999 , among others, demonstrate that intergenerational transfers from young to old generations in the form of pay-as-you-go public pensions tend to lower percapita income growth by discouraging private savings and investment. For a similar reason, policies that imply transfers from the old to the young may foster growth as they are likely to stimulate private savings. In fact, Jones and Manuelli 1992 demonstrate that tax-nanced transfers from the old to the young augment percapita income growth. A similar argument underlies Uhlig and Yanagawa 1996 who consider a policy that by shifting the tax burden away from labor to capital income moves the tax burden from the young to the old which again may h a ve a positive impact on growth.
In light of these contributions we can state our results as follows. A union formed by the working young which succeeds in raising the aggregate wage bill e ectively transfers resources from the dissaving old to the saving young which, in turn, may lead to higher aggregate savings and percapita income growth.
We establish and discuss our results in the following ve sections. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 studies the competitive equilibrium which serves as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis. Our main result is presented in Section 4 where we study the equilibrium with unionized labor and highlight the link between the union's objective and economic growth. Section 5 analyzes the welfare implications of the equilibrium with unionized labor. Finally, Section 6 considers some extensions and discusses the robustness of our results.
The Model

The Household Sector
The household sector has a simple overlapping generations structure a la Samuelson 1956 and Diamond 1965 . Each generation is represented by a single individual who lives for two periods. In the rst period the individual supplies labor out of her initial labor endowment which is normalized to one, and receives wage income. This income is used to consume and to save. In the second period of life the individual retires and lives on the proceeds of her savings.
An individual born at time t draws utility from young and old age consumption. Lifetime utility u t is determined by: 1 as the discount factor common to all generations. It is well known that this speci cation neutralizes income and substitution e ects associated with changes in the interest rate. 1 Each generation takes the real wage w t in t and the real interest rate r t+1 on savings from t to t + 1 as given and 1 See Section 6 for a discussion of how a more general utility function would a ect our results. . For logarithmic utility this involves the following savings function:
Moreover, given that an individual does not care about leisure, she always desires to supply as much labor as possible so that: L t = minfL t ; 1g:
The Production Sector
Identical rms hire the aggregate capital stock, K t ; and demand labor supplied by the young. Both factors are used to produce a homogeneous goodaccording to a neoclassical production function F K it ; A t L it , where K it and L it are capital and labor inputs hired by rm i, whereas A t is an index of the economy-wide stock of knowledge in t: The function F exhibits constant returns to scale and satis es standard concavity and di erentiability conditions.
Factor markets are competitive in the sense that rms take factor prices as given. In equilibrium all rms produce with the same capital intensity so that K it =A t L it = K t =A t L t k t . The respective rst order conditions for pro t maxiTrade Union Objectives and Economic Growth 5 mization are:
where fk t Fk t ; 1 with f 0 0 and f 00 0.
We endogenize productivity growth following Arrow 1962 , Sheshinski 1967 , and Romer 1986 as a learning-by-investing" e ect, i.e., A t = K t : 2 Hence, an increase in the aggregate stock o f capital augments the stock o f knowledge available in the economy one-to-one. An immediate implication of 2 is that the economy produces with a capital intensity k t = 1=L t so that factor prices become:
4 Equation 4 implies that for a given level of employment the wage rate is proportional to the aggregate stock of capital. The factor of proportionality !L t represents the external return on capital per unit of employed labor caused by the spillover from cumulated investment on labor productivity. Indeed, if productivity growth stems from 2, aggregate production is determined by Y t = FK t ; K t L t .
In addition, if factor prices are determined by 3 and 4, one nds that the social return on capital is dY t =dK t = r t + !L t L t . Since the productivity enhancing e ect of aggregate investment is not priced, the social return on capital exceeds its private counterpart where !L t L t is the external return that accrues to employed labor.
For further reference, observe that: i.e., a higher employment per rm raises the marginal productivity of the existing capital and lowers the marginal productivity of labor.
The Competitive Equilibrium
Before introducing a trade union we make a short detour and quickly recall the perfect foresight equilibrium under full employment which serves as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis.
Given an initial level of capital K 0 owned by the old generation, a competitive equilibrium determines a sequence fs t ; c y t ; c o t ; w t ; r t ; K t+1 ; L t ; A t g 1 t=0 such that: E1 each generation t saves according to 1, E2 for all t aggregate savings equals aggregate investment: s t = K t+1 ; E3 for all t there is full employment: L t = 1 ; E4 for all t the factor price conditions 3 and 4 hold.
The unique competitive equilibrium is a balanced growth equilibrium with a constant i n terest rate and a constant growth rate of wages, capital, and per capita output. Indeed, from E3 and E4 one nds that for all t the following holds: r t = r = f 0 1 ; w t = w t = K t !1; 7 where the latter implies that wages and capital grow at the same pace. From E1 and E2 one nds that capital accumulation in all periods obeys to:
1 + w t = K t+1 : Substituting for w t employing 7 gives:
Hence, the laissez-faire growth rate, g , of capital, percapita output, and wages can bewritten as:
As g is independent of time, the system jumps immediately to the balanced growth equilibrium.
Introducing a Trade Union
The Union's Objective
The trade union is formed by the working population. The OLG structure set out above implies that only the young of each period are union members. Following Pencavel 1984 we model union preferences over pairs of wages and levels of employment in t: More precisely, the union evaluates a tuple w t ; L t according to the function:
The rst argument i n 8 i s a w age mark-up de ned as the di erence between the actual and the competitive w age. The second argument is the rate of employment in t. The parameter 2 0; 1 determines how m uch w eight the union attaches to wages and employment, respectively. The union rationally anticipates aggregate labor demand which results from the rms' pro t maximizing behavior. Considering equations 4 and 7 and the fact that the aggregate stock of capital K t is predetermined at t, 8 can be written as:
As K t is a given constant at time t, the union's maximization problem reduces to:
The solution is characterized in the following proposition. Proposition 1 states a condition for an interior solution to the union's maximization problem. Since the union attaches some weight to wages 0, the chosen level of employment falls short of full employment. On the other hand, condition 9 gives an upper bound on the weight on wages so that the union never chooses to reduce employment t o zero.
Equation 10 shows that the chosen level of employmentL t relates the wage mark-up to the available technology via the elasticity and the preference parameter :In view of 4, is the elasticity of wages with respect to the level of employment. To get more intuition for the economics implied by 10, it is useful to link to the elasticity of substitution between capital and e cient labor and to the output elasticity o f e cient labor. Lemma 1. Let L t denote the elasticity of substitution between capital K t and labor in e ciency units A t L t ; and "L t the output elasticity of labor in e ciency units. Then, L t can bewritten as:
Proof : Considering equations 4 and 6, L t becomes:
where the argument o f f is 1=L t . Straightforward manipulation of the right hand side leads to 11, where:
In light of Lemma 1 condition 10 becomes:
This form reveals that the resulting wage mark-up is inversely related to both the elasticity of substitution between capital and e cient labor and the output elasticity of e cient labor. The economic intuition behind this result is as follows. If capital and labor in e ciency units become better substitutes, setting wages above the competitive level becomes more costly in terms of foregone employment. As a consequence, the union chooses a higher level of employment and the wage mark up falls. Furthermore, if the output elasticity of e cient labor is high, a reduction in employment has a substantial impact on aggregate output and, henceforth, on the share of output that accrues to labor. This implies that the costs associated with a reduction in employment are high which induces the union to choose a small mark-up. Condition 10 implicitly relates employment to the union's preference parameter .
Lemma 2. dL t =d 0 for all 2 0; and lim !0Lt = 1 :
Proof : Applying the implicit function theorem to the rst-order condition of the union's maximization problem and considering the respective second-order condition gives the result. Q.E.D.
As expected the chosen level of unemployment increases as the union attaches more weight to the wage mark-up. Yet, as 9 shows, must be bounded from above. In light of Lemma 1, the upper bound becomes:
The following CES example demonstrates how depends on the elasticity o f substitution. The bound is equal to 1 if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1 and strictly smaller than 1 otherwise. Moreover, the relationship between and the elasticity o f substitution is discontinuous and non-monotonic.
Example. In the CES case the production function takes the form:
where is constant by de nition. Straightforward algebra yields: 
Equilibrium with Unionized Labor
A perfect foresight equilibrium with unionized labor determines a sequence fs t ; c y t ; c o t ; w t ; r t ; K t+1 ; L t ; A t g 1 t=0 given K 0 which satis es E1, E2, and E4 stated in Section 3 and the following labor market equilibrium condition:
E3' L t =L t for all t, which states that the level of employment in the economy is determined as the quantity of labor that maximizes the union's objective. Clearly, for each rm the corresponding wage is binding so that the equilibrium wage becomes w t =ŵ t = !L t K t .
From the union's problem it can beinferred that the optimal choice of employment is time-invariant, i.e.,L t =L. Thus, from a similar reasoning as applied in Section 3 it follows that the equilibrium exhibits a constant interestr = f 0 L and a constant growth rate. The latter is given by: g = 1 + !LL , 1:
12
From Lemma 2 we can infer thatL is a continuous function of in a neighborhood of = 0 . Thus, asĝ is a continuous function ofL, it follows that for su ciently small, the equilibrium growth rateĝ can be written as a continuous function g =ĝ relating union preferences to the growth rate of percapita income. The following proposition states a condition on the technology and on union preferences under which the growth rate of the equilibrium with unionized labor exceeds the growth rate of the competitive equilibrium. The intuitive argument behind this result is as follows. The total e ect of a reduction in employment due to unionization can be decomposed in an e ect on the functional distribution of income and an output e ect. The former occurs as for a given output a reduction in employment increases the wage rate and reduces the interest rate. The distribution e ect is measured by the elasticity of substitution between capital and e cient labor . As is well known, the labor share of aggregate income will increase if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one. However, an increase in the labor share is not su cient to increase total labor income the wage bill and, in light of 12, the growth rate. This is because a reduction in employment reduces aggregate output, i.e., causes a negative output e ect. The output e ect on the wage bill and the growth rate is measured by the output elasticity of e cient labor ". Since " is the share of aggregate output that accrues to labor, it measures to what extend labor income is reduced when aggregate production falls. In sum, for the growth rate to exceed the competitive level ĝ g the technology must be such that the e ect of a reduction in employment on the functional distribution of income in favor of labor more than outweighs the e ect on aggregate output that accrues to labor. If this is the case, the aggregate wage bill rises and triggers a positive e ect on aggregate savings and growth.
Unionization and Welfare
This section studies the welfare e ects that materialize when the economy moves away from full employment to an equilibrium with a constant level of unemployment in all periods. We w ant t o k n o w h o w the welfare of current and future generations changes when such a switch takes place. To answer this question, we rst consider a marginal reduction in employment which occurs in period t = 0 and is maintained throughout all future periods and analyze its impact on the lifetime utility of all generations. Subsequently, we relate the welfare results to the ndings of the previous section and provide a link between union objectives, economic growth, and individual welfare.
Suppose the economy is on an equilibrium path with L t = L, r t = r, and a constant growth rate g of capital, per capita output, and wages, and consider a constant and permanent marginal reduction in employment dL 0 at time t = 0 . Then, the welfare of the current old, the current young, and all yet unborn generations are a ected as follows.
The Current Old. The welfare of the old at time t = 0 is given by: u ,1 = u w ,1 L ,1 , s ,1 ; 1 + r s ,1 ; where w ,1 , L ,1 and s ,1 are predetermined at time t = 0. Di erentiating with respect to the level of employment gives: du ,1 dL = u 2;,1 dr dL s ,1 ;
so that in view of 5 one nds:
du ,1 dL = ,u 2;,1 f 00 L 2 s ,1 0:
13 Thus, a reduction in employment reduces the welfare of the current old. This is due to a capital income e ect. It occurs as the marginal productivity of the existing capital stock shrinks when employment falls. This reduces the return on old age savings and, henceforth, consumption of the current old.
The Current Young. Welfare of the young at time t = 0 is given by: u 0 = u w 0 L , s 0 ; 1 + r s 0 :
A marginal decrease in employment a t time t = 0 and t = 1 leads to considering the Envelope theorem and the fact that K 0 is predetermined at time 0: du 0 dL = u 1;0 dw 0 L dL + u 2;0 s 0 dr dL : Replacing w 0 by !L K 0 and considering that u 1;0 = 1 + r u 2;0 and s 0 = K 1 = 1 + g K 0 , this can bewritten as:
14 Thus, what matters for the welfare of the current y oung is the impact of a decrease in L on the current wage bill wage income e ect and on the discounted capital income which accrues in t = 1 to the capital stock 1 + g times as large as in t = 0
capital income e ect. Again, the latter e ect is negative. To e v aluate the overall e ect, substitute 4, 5, and 6 into 14 to get after some manipulations:
15 It will be seen below that this expression permits a very straightforward interpretation of the e ects of a reduction in employment on the welfare of the current young.
Future Generations. The utility o f some generation l 2 N is given by: u l = u w l L , s l ; 1 + r s l :
Considering that w l = !L K l , K l = 1 + g l K 0 , and 1 + g = =1 + !LL, u l becomes:
Di erentiating with respect to L and considering that s l = 1 + gK l and u 1;l = 1 + ru 2;l , one obtains after some manipulations:
This expression generalizes 14 to the case of l 0. Again, there is a capital income e ect which has the same interpretation as the one in 14. However, now there is a cumulated wage income e ect. This is because the reduction in employment dL does not only impinge on the wage bill in t = l but also on the wage bill in all preceding periods t 0. A similar procedure as above leads to:
From this equation and equations 13 and 15 the following inferences can bedrawn:
Proposition 4. Part i follows immediately from the observation that a marginal reduction in employment in period 0 hurts the old whose level of consumption solely relies on capital income. All later generations su er similar losses in capital income when old. Yet, they may bene t from a wage income e ect when young. Considering the analysis in Section 4 wage and capital income e ects can be expressed in terms of distribution and output e ects. In fact, part ii of Proposition 4 states that the generation of the current young will bene t from a reduction in employment if the shift from capital income of generation ,1 to labor income of generation 0, i.e. the distribution e ect, outweighs the output e ects arising at time 0 and time 1. The distribution e ect is strong if is low see Section 4. The output e ects occur in terms of reduced labor income when young and reduced capital income when old. At time 0 the share of a reduction in aggregate output born by the wage earning generation 0 is equal to " the labor share. At time 1 generation 0 is interest earner and the respective share is equal to 1 , " the capital share. Naturally, one has to consider that the output e ect at t = 1 i s 1 + g times larger than at t = 0 and that it must be discounted with the rate r. Part iii states that a reduction in employment at time t = 0 increases the welfare of some generation l and all subsequent generations if it generates a rise in per capita income growth see Proposition 3. This is because the wage income e ect cumulates over time and eventually dominates the capital income e ect so that generation l and all subsequent generations bene t from the permanent reduction in employment at time 0.
The link between welfare, union objectives, and growth is now easily established.
Corollary 1. Let 1 + "1 + 1 + g 1 + r 1 , "1 1:
16 Then, there is some~ 2 0; so thatĝ g for all 2
, 0;~ and the welfare of all generations which adhere to the union is improved.
Proof : By part ii of Proposition 4, condition 16 implies that dL 0 increases the welfare of each generation t 0 which adheres to the union. Since, condition 16 implies 1+"1 1, the claim follows with Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 gives the local condition under which a marginal rise in wages above the competitive level and the associated decrease in employment augments the welfare of all generations but generation ,1. It emphasizes that there are union preferences of the type 8 so that a union actually chooses a level of employment which increases both percapita income growth and welfare of all generations but the current old.
Discussion
Union Preferences. The preceding analysis can be used to assess the implications for growth of alternative union's objective functions discussed in the literature. Consider rst the total wage bill maximization approach advocated by Dunlop 1944 . Given the simple growth model with externalities from capital formation, the wage bill maximization approach implies that the union chooses a level of employment that leads to maximum growth. Consider next the case of a rents-from-unionization objective emphasized by Rosen 1969 , de Menil 1971 , and Calvo 1978 , among others. The union objective function that we have employed in this paper converges to this case if the weight the union puts on wages, , approaches 1 2. The union then chooses a level of employment which de nitely exceeds the growth maximizing one. It may bethe case that the growth rate of the unionized economy falls short of the competitive level, even though the local condition for unionization to stimulate economic growth stated in Proposition 3 holds true. Finally, consider a utility oriented approach, suggested, e.g., by Farber1978 and Oswald 1982 , in which the union's objective coincides with the individual objectives of its members. From equation 15 it can be inferred that in the present OLG framework such a union chooses a level of employmentL which satis es:
L + "L + 1 + gL 1 + rL 1 , "L 1; with = ifL 1;
i.e., which maximizes lifetime utility of the union's members at each point in time.
In fact, ifL 1, the union chooses a level of employment which leads to higher growth than obtained in a competitive economy but not to maximum growth. This is because a union which maximizes lifetime utility of its members also takes into account the negative e ect of unemployment on capital income born by its members when old. Length of Lifetimes. The conditions for a labor union fostering per capita income growth derived in this paper are closely linked to the assumption of a twoperiod overlapping generations structure. In this economy only young individuals save so that aggregate savings exclusively stem from labor income. If individual lifetimes extend to more than two periods, the conditions for a monopoly union to spur economic can beexpected to bemore restrictive. This is because in such a framework savings generally do not only stem from labor but also from capital income. In this case the negative capital income e ect of unionization discussed in Section 5 will have a dampening e ect on aggregate savings and, henceforth, on growth. In the extreme case of in nite lifetimes our results would be reversed. As has been shown by Bertola 1993 in such a framework savings stem solely from capital income implying that redistributing from capitalists to workers necessarily reduces economic growth.
Savings Function. By con ning attention to logarithmic utility we excluded that savings depends on the interest rate. If we considered a savings function with the interest as one of its arguments, the conditions for unionization to stimulate economic growth would either bemore or less restrictive, depending on whether savings would be positively or negatively related to the interest rate. If savings are increasing in the interest rate, the negative e ect of unionization on the interest rate lowers aggregate savings and exerts a depressing e ect on percapita income growth. If, on the other hand, savings are negatively related to the interest rate, the same reasoning points to a further positive e ect of unionization on growth.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
It is easily veri ed thatṼ L t 0 for some L t 2 0; 1. Thus, asṼ 1 = 0 it follows thatL t 1. Next, consider V L t ! 0. IfṼ L t ! 0 = 0, the preceding argument reveals thatL t 0: Thus, assume thatṼ L t ! 0 0. This implies that !L t ! 0 = 1. We demonstrate that this leads to lim L t !0 dṼ =dL t 0 for . Di erentiation ofṼ with respect to L t yields: From the latter and !L t ! 0 = 1 it follows that 0 i f as given in 9.
To demonstrate thatṼ L t = !L t , !1L t 0 for L t ! 0; it is su cient to show that lim L t !0 ! L t , ! 1 L t = 0 since by assumptionṼ L t ! 0 0. This, in turn, holds true since: 
